The Brains Blog

Perceptual Idealism and Phenomenal Geometry

My account of 3D vision attempts to preserve many of the traditional commitments of naïve realism, whilst rejecting its central tenet of mind-independence. In this fourth post I explain why this provides a more satisfactory solution to variations in scene geometry with viewing conditions than recent ‘four-dimensional’ accounts. 1. Naïve …

Seeing Depth with One Eye and Pictorial Space

Paul Linton June 27, 2018 June 27, 2018 Cognition / Paul Linton: The Perception and Cognition of Visual Space / perception / Psychology

In my second post I questioned whether the integration of pictorial cues and binocular disparity occurs at the level of perception. In this third post, I push the argument further by questioning whether pictorial cues contribute to 3D vision at all. 1. ‘Monocular Stereopsis’ (Seeing Depth with One Eye) It …

Perceptual Integration and Visual Illusions

Paul Linton June 26, 2018 June 29, 2018 Cognition / Delusion / Paul Linton: The Perception and Cognition of Visual Space / perception / Psychology

In my first post I argued that inconsistencies in visual space reflect a conflict between visual experience and perceptual judgement. In this second post I argue that the same approach can be applied to (a) the integration of depth cues, and (b) illusions of visual space, to show that they …

Visual Space and the Perception / Cognition Divide

Paul Linton June 25, 2018 June 25, 2018 Cognition / Paul Linton: The Perception and Cognition of Visual Space / perception

I want to thank John Schwenkler for inviting me to blog about my new book The Perception and Cognition of Visual Space (Palgrave, 2018). In this first post I outline the two major concerns of 3D vision: (1) inconstancy, and (2) inconsistency, and suggest that inconsistency can be avoided by …

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John Schwenkler June 25, 2018 July 2, 2018 books

Thanks to Paul Linton for blogging this week on The Perception and Cognition of Visual Space, published 2017 by Palgrave MacMillan. To read all his posts on a single page, click here.

4. The Technical View, and Summing Up

Carrie Figdor May 10, 2018 March 10, 2020 animal cognition / Carrie Figdor: Pieces of Mind / Concepts / metaphysics of mind

In the previous post I articulated Literalism to a degree. In the book I articulate it further by responding to a series of objections, at least some of which have no doubt occurred to you. Since these are likely to be raised in comments, in this post I will present …

3. Literalism (Expanded Somewhat)

Carrie Figdor May 9, 2018 May 7, 2018 animal cognition / Carrie Figdor: Pieces of Mind

Anthropocentric tradition holds that the (somewhat idealized) human case is the standard for what counts as a real instance of a psychological capacity. But even if we learn about minds from the human case, it does not follow that humans are the standard for objectively correct ascriptions. For the Literalist, …