Stacey Goguen Boston University One of the striking aspects of stereotype threat is that it demonstrates ways in which a stereotype that you might not necessarily believe (and perhaps even likely do not believe) can nonetheless significantly affect you cognitively and psychologically. For instance, math majors who are primed to think about …
Alex Madva Cal Poly Pomona alexmadva.com Tamar Szabó Gendler (2008, 2011), and subsequently Andy Egan (2011), have argued that implicit biases pit our moral and epistemic aims against each other. They cite research suggesting that the strength of implicit biases correlates with the knowledge individuals have of prevalent stereotypes, even …
Edouard Machery University of Pittsburgh Philosophers have mostly focused on the practical implications of the recent psychological research on biases (racism, sexism, etc.) and, more generally, on attitudes (e.g., political attitudes). As is by now well known, this impressive body of work is based on novel indirect measures such as …
Keith Frankish Visiting Research Fellow, The Open University www.keithfrankish.com Jo sincerely affirms that black people are no less trustworthy than white people. Yet despite this, she consistently behaves in ways that reflect the assumption that black people are less trustworthy — subtly adjusting her behaviour towards black people across a …
Michael Brownstein, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, John Jay College/CUNY, www.michaelsbrownstein.com Jennifer Saul, Professor of Philosophy, University of Sheffield, and Director of the Society for Women in Philosophy UK, https://www.sheffield.ac.uk/philosophy/staff/profiles/saul *** Many thanks to John for inviting us and the contributors to post here at the Brains Blog about Implicit Bias and Philosophy, …
As I laid out in Wednesday’s post, on my view emotions are about affordances that are of instrumental value for us. When we are afraid, we represent something as a danger-to-be-avoided. Since I take danger to be a relational property that constitutes the affordance in question, it might be hard …
In my first post on Monday, I mentioned that emotions have a complex normative dimension and that noncognitive accounts do not pay enough attention to the normativity of emotions. Embodied accounts (as I argued in yesterday’s post) explain quite nicely the central role that internal arousal, bodily postures, and facial …
