Barsalou, Glenberg, Prinz, Damasio and other neo-empiricists have theoretically and experimentally challenged the once dominant view that representations in higher cognitive processes are amodal (eg, Fodor, Pylyshyn). They have renewed a  century-old perspective on the mind, according to which representations in perceptual processes and representations in higher cognitive processes are, …

Semantic properties of mind and language: The Standard View

Which, if any, semantic properties would the utterances of a community of language users have, even if we assumed that the language users had no internal semantic states? My answer will come in multiple posts. Note that by ‘semantic properties’ I mean things like reference, truth, aboutness, and usability-in-an-inference. I will ultimately argue, with a couple of caveats, that their expressions would have a full suite of semantic properties.

In this, the first post in the series, I summarize, defend, and clarify the Standard View of the relationship between the semantic properties of internal states and public linguistic expressions. I’d be interested in comments, as these are ideas I’m slowly developing, and injections of criticism at this early juncture would be most welcome.

Pluralistic Localism about Concepts

Dan Weiskopf, “Atomism, Pluralism, and Conceptual Content,” unpublished ms.In this interesting paper, Weiskopf defends an original theory of concepts, which may be called pluralistic localism.  The main components of the view are as follows:“(Localism) Concepts have constituent structure(Dual Content) Concepts have both referential and cognitive content(Indiv*) Concepts are individuated by …

Back to Top