Do Plants Have Minds?

Plants don’t have minds. At least, that’s what most people think. A few years ago, that’s also what I thought. Then, reflecting on the work of Ruth Millikan and Fred Dretske, I started wondering why it seemed obvious, and whether it should. This led me to write a short book …

Perception: Representational Properties and Phenomenological Properties

Consider the visual experience of a normally functioning subject who consciously sees a red ball in front of her in daylight. This experience has representational properties, it is of or about something, e.g. the red ball, and it has phenomenological properties, e.g. there is something it is like to see …

CFP Special Issue of Minds and Machines on Computation and Representation in Cognitive Neuroscience

GUEST EDITOR Gualtiero Piccinini, University of Missouri – St. Louis INTRODUCTION Cognitive neuroscientists routinely explain cognition in terms of neural computations over neural representations. Yet some critics argue that cognitive neuroscience does not need the notions of neural computation and representations or, worse, that these notions are untenable. Whether or …

The Unexplained Intellect: The Mind is Not a Hoard of Sentences

In subsequent posts I’ll focus on The Unexplained Intellect’s main claims.  In this one I’ll identify the cause that those claims serve.  I’m grateful to the blog’s editor for the opportunity to do this (and to you for reading).

Explaining Representation in New Ideas in Psychology

A special issue of New Ideas in Psychology on Explaining Representation, edited by Marcin Miłkowski and Konrad Talmont-Kaminski is just out, with contributions by Bill Ramsey, Paweł Gładziejewski, Rob Clowes and Dina Mendonça, Wayne Christensen and John Michael, Witold Hensel, Krystyna Bielecka, Paweł Grabarczyk and myself. Some of the contributions are based on talks …

#MindsOnline2015 Session 4: Philosophy of Neuroscience and Cognitive Science

The fourth and final session of the Minds Online conference has begun! It is focused on the Philosophy of Neuroscience and Cognitive Science, and includes the following papers: Karen Neander (Duke) “Why I’m Not A Content Pragmatist” (Keynote) Marcelo Fischborn (Federal University of Santa Maria): “Libet-Style Experiments, Neuroscience, and Libertarian Free Will” …

#MindsOnline2015, Session 2: Perception and Consciousness

The second session of the 2015 Minds Online conference has begun! It is on the theme of Perception and Consciousness, and includes the following papers: Nico Orlandi (UC Santa Cruz): Bayesian Perception Is Ecological Perception (KEYNOTE) Derek H. Brown (Brandon University): “Colour Layering and Colour Relationalism” Commentators: Mazviita Chirimuuta and Jonathan Cohen Jonathan Farrell (Manchester): “‘What …

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