Inquiry under bounds (Part 4: Justifying the account)
This post gives three arguments for the reason-responsive consequentialist view of rational inquiry.
This post gives three arguments for the reason-responsive consequentialist view of rational inquiry.
This post develops a theory of rational inquiry for bounded agents: the reason-responsive consequentialist view.
This post introduces bounded rationality by contrasting it with a received Standard Picture of rationality.
This post begins a five-part series introducing David Thorstad’s book, Inquiry under bounds.
Philipp Berghofer Department of Philosophy, University of Graz, Austria I’m very grateful to Mahdi Khalili, Andrea Reichenberger, and Harald Wiltsche for engaging so carefully with my work and for raising questions and concerns that have pushed me to refine and develop my position. I’m in the fortunate position to reply …
Harald A. Wiltsche, Department of Philosophy & Applied Ethics, Linköping University, Sweden It is a common perception that phenomenology and the broader “continental” strand in modern philosophy is characterized by a distant, and at times, even adversarial attitude towards the exact sciences. However, this perception is increasingly being challenged, if …
Andrea Reichenberger Technical University of Munich Philipp Berghofer champions a phenomenological experience-first epistemology und he argues for the justificatory force of experiences. The significance that experience has for our everyday lives seems indisputable. Experience is so much a part of everyday life and everyday language that it seems futile to …