Computation and Cognitive Science 7-8th July 2008 King’s College, Cambridge Supported by The British Academy, The British Society for the Philosophy of Science, King’s College Cambridge, Microsoft Research, and The Mind Association Speakers: Kenneth Aizawa (Centenary College, Louisiana) William Bechtel (UCSD) Jack Copeland (University of Canterbury) Frances Egan (Rutgers) Chris …
Asks Ken Aizawa. Answer: Never.Thanks a lot to Arnold, Anibal, Eric, Tony, and Ken for a great discussion of whether we may ignore neuroscience. The bottom line is that I’ve been accused of “methodological imperialism” for suggesting that philosophers of mind ought to take neuroscience into account. Well, I don’t …
One of the best ideas I’ve read about, from today’s NYT. I had to share.
Here.
Because philosophers are taking brains more seriously, of course!This is in response to some recent discussion of whether philosophy is better off than ten years ago.In the last ten years, more philosophers have started to think seriously about the nervous system, and the relationship between brains and minds, than ever …
A recent post over at Cranky Philosopher argues that it isn’t. His post opens with: The thesis of this post is that there are non-intentional mental states. To establish this thesis all I need is one good example. So consider the felt pain that ensues when I plunge my hand …
In the last few days, Brains has received a lot of visitors from the Netherlands. Depending on the time of the day, they have been the largest group of visitors by country. Welcome, guys! This can’t be a coincidence. If any of you kind readers has an explanation for this phenomenon, please let us know …
