How could we cast suspicion on the semantic poverty thesis discussed in Part III? (Recall this is the view that ‘no amount of analysis, conjunction, or <insert your favorite semantic construction method here> applied to concepts about brain states will yield a concept about subjective experience as such.’). One way …
When I first heard about the extended-mind thesis (EMT), some time in the mid-2000s, I was instantly intrigued—mainly because it feels so intuitively right. Driving my car, I often feel that I am my car, or that my car is me. Driving a rental car, especially as I pull it …
Another attempt at popularising my work from over at idontknowwhatiam “I awoke at night – it must have been about 3am – and realized that I was completely unable to move. I was absolutely certain I was not dreaming, as I was enjoying full consciousness. Filled with fear about my …
The problem of personal identity is one of the most bewitching puzzles in all of philosophy. Until very recently, most philosophers subscribed to the view first advocated by the 17th-century British philosopher, John Locke. Locke held that our fundamental nature is given by our status as self-conscious, rational agents (“persons”) …
In my last post I want to go back to delusions. Isn’t it just hopeless to suggest that they can achieve epistemic innocence? It probably is, as delusions violate all norms of rationality for beliefs we can think of. But it is important to ask whether delusions have any redeeming …
In the last post I offered examples of confabulatory explanations as attempts to give reasons for attitudes whose source might escape introspection or be otherwise difficult or impossible to access. The interesting philosophical question for me is whether confabulation carries any epistemic benefit.
This is my first ‘real’ blog post, and before I begin, I’d like to thank John for inviting me to contribute to this blog (and apologize for the fact that it’s taken me while to get around to doing so). Many thanks for giving me this opportunity! I have recently …
