3. Introducing Cognitive Structures

In the previous post, I have remarked that the existing forms of SR do not use the full capacity of their logical frameworks to account for a substantial relation between the structure of the scientific theories and reality. If we regiment the structure of scientific theories into formal frameworks that …

2. A Tale of Two Theories

Previously I introduced the problem of scientific representation and remarked that Cognitive Structural Realism (CSR) aims to address it. CSR is (evidently) a version of SR, but it is also the inheritor of Ronald Giere and colleagues’ Cognitive Models of Science Approach (CMSA). In this post, I explain how CSR …

1. Cognitive Structural Realism

I am grateful to John Schwenkler for giving me the opportunity to present my first book Cognitive Structural Realism, which aims to consolidate the ties between the philosophy of science and cognitive science. There already is some connection between these fields, given that the philosophy of cognitive science is a …

Where Are All the Successful Analyses?

I promised a surprise for today’s post. It’s a nasty one. Philosophical analysis is a search for the essential natures of such things as knowledge, justice, and causality. I’ve been defending analysis on two fronts. First, I’ve argued that it its inputs—the case judgments delivered by our “starter theories” of …

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