Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds: Modal Skepticism

In the previous post I presented the main arguments against the method of cases developed in Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds. Various objections can be raised against this argument, some of which have already been put in print. Chapter 5 addresses 8 objections: I defend the experimental quality of the research …

CFP: Computer Modeling in Philosophy

CALL FOR PAPERS for a topical issue of Open Philosophy “Computer Modeling in Philosophy” Open Philosophy (https://www.degruyter.com/view/j/opphil) invites submissions for the topical issue “Computer Modeling in Philosophy,” edited by Patrick Grim (Stony Brook/University of Michigan). Computational modeling opens new prospects for philosophical exploration and argument. The role played by logic …

Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds: Unreliability, Dogmatism, and Parochialism

In the previous post, I argued for a minimalist characterization of the method of cases, which I share with some of the most well-known critics of experimental philosophy. In this post, I want to present the two arguments against the method of cases, developed in Chapter 3 and 4 of …

Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds: The Method of Cases

In the previous post, I introduced the method of cases: To find out whether modal claims are true, philosophers describe actual and possible situations and assess what facts hold in these situations. For instance, following Gettier’s classic paper, to determine whether, necessarily, someone knows that pif and only if she …

Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds: The Overall Argument

Does responsibility require the possibility to have done otherwise? Does knowledge require safety? Can causation be reduced to some form of counterfactual dependency? Could a material duplicate fail to be a psychological duplicate? To answer these and similar questions, one must gain knowledge about metaphysical possibilities and necessities. One must …

Back to Top