We are grateful to Elizabeth Schechter for blogging this week on Self-Consciousness and ‘Split’ Brains (Oxford, 2018). To view all her posts on a single page, please click here.
List of Underrepresented Philosophers of Neuroscience
There is a new list of members of underrepresented groups working in philosophy of neuroscience (e.g., traditional philosophy of science topics in neuroscience, foundational issues in cognitive, computational, systems, molecular, and cellular neuroscience). The purpose of this list is to provide as comprehensive a list as possible of members of underrepresented …
Neural Mechanisms Webconference 2018: New Challenges in Philosophy of Neuroscience
The editors of Neural Mechanisms Online announce the program for their 2018 webconference, on the topic of New Challenges in the Philosophy of Neuroscience. For more information, visit the conference program. Friday 5 October 2018 FROM … WHO? TITLE 8 GMT Hong Yu Wong Embodiment: Structure and Mechanisms 9 GMT …
Symposium on Christoph Hoerl’s “Experience and Time: Transparency and Presence”
It’s my pleasure to introduce our next Ergo symposium, featuring Christoph Hoerl’s “Experience and Time: Transparency and Presence” with commentaries by Elliot Carter (University of Toronto) Geoffrey Lee (University of California, Berkeley), Louise Richardson (University of York). I’d like to thank each of the participants for their great work!
Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds: Conceptual Analysis and Conceptual Engineering
In the previous post, I defended a restricted form of modal skepticism and I concluded that many traditional philosophical issues could not be resolved and should be set aside. One may wonder what is left for philosophers to do: Am I suggesting to close philosophy departments? Fear not, dear reader, …
[CFP] The Meta-Problem of Consciousness
This is a call for papers for a symposium in the Journal of Consciousness Studies on David Chalmers’ new paper “The Meta-Problem of Consciousness”. More than twenty years ago, David Chalmers published “Facing Up to the Problem of Consciousness” in the Journal of Consciousness Studies. He distinguished between the “easy …
Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds: Modal Skepticism
In the previous post I presented the main arguments against the method of cases developed in Philosophy Within Its Proper Bounds. Various objections can be raised against this argument, some of which have already been put in print. Chapter 5 addresses 8 objections: I defend the experimental quality of the research …