Self-Consciousness and “Split” Brains: The Capacity for Self-Distinction

Split-brain subjects talk about themselves using the first-person, singular, pronoun. Of course, by hypothesis, it’s always just one of two split-brain thinkers doing the talking. (In some subjects, R seems to have learned to speak a bit, but never in whole sentences.) Still, this thinker and speaker—L—consistently uses the first-person …

Self-Consciousness and “Split” Brains: The Objection from Unified Behavior

In yesterday’s post I argued that a split-brain subject is not unitary qua thinker but is actually composed of two thinkers. The book also defends two further, related duality claims: that R and L are distinct subjects of experience and that they are distinct intentional agents. To many people, however, …

Depiction, Pictorial Experience, and Vision Science Conference

I’m delighted to announce that registration is now open for the Depiction, Pictorial Experience, and Vision Science conference at the University of Glasgow’s Centre for the Study of Perceptual Experience on 15-17 November 2018.   Speakers: Solveig Aasen, University of Oslo John Kulvicki, Dartmouth College Clare Mac Cumhaill, University of Geneva Fiona Macpherson, University of Glasgow Bence Nanay, University of …

Self-Consciousness and “Split” Brains: The Duality Claims

The book argues for three duality claims: one concerning split-brain consciousness, one concerning split-brain intentional agency, and one concerning split-brain psychology generally. Each of the duality claims amounts to a claim about personal identity. If there are two centers or streams of conscious there must be two subjects of conscious …

Self-Consciousness and “Split” Brains: The split-brain phenomenon

Thanks, John, for this opportunity to talk about my book, and thanks, everyone else, for reading. The book is an empirically informed work of personal identity about the split-brain phenomenon. “Split-brain surgery” is a colloquial term for a surgery that cuts through the corpus callosum (and sometimes additional white matter …

List of Underrepresented Philosophers of Neuroscience

There is a new list of members of underrepresented groups working in philosophy of neuroscience (e.g., traditional philosophy of science topics in neuroscience, foundational issues in cognitive, computational, systems, molecular, and cellular neuroscience). The purpose of this list is to provide as comprehensive a list as possible of members of underrepresented …

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