CFA: Perception and Justified Belief

Call for Submissions: Workshop on Perception and Justified Belief (Bochum, June 2017) We invite submissions of extended abstracts for presentation at the workshop. The aim of the workshop is to discuss the relation between perception and justified belief, and issues relevant to the relation. For instance, we are interested in debates concerning: …

Perception: Representational Properties and Phenomenological Properties

Consider the visual experience of a normally functioning subject who consciously sees a red ball in front of her in daylight. This experience has representational properties, it is of or about something, e.g. the red ball, and it has phenomenological properties, e.g. there is something it is like to see …

CFP: iCog 2017

We welcome paper proposals for the 4th iCog conference to be held at the University of Oxford, on the 17th and 18th of June, 2017. The conference will explore the role that perceptual processes play in our capacity to track and make sense of observed actions by bringing together researchers …

Quietism, Naive Realism, and the Nature of Philosophy

One of the reasons why philosophical discussions of colour are interesting and important is that they bear on a number of wider philosophical questions. In today’s post I want to introduce some meta-philosophical questions about the nature of philosophical inquiry that philosophical discussions of colour help to bring into focus. …

Colours as Observational Properties

The second main claim made by the naïve realist is that colours are distinct from the physical properties of objects. In saying that colours are distinct from the physical properties of objects, the naïve realist is not necessarily saying that are ‘perfectly simple’ properties whose nature cannot be described further; …

Colour Constancy and the Mind-Independence of Colour

According to the naïve realist, colours are mind-independent properties of objects that are distinct from their physical properties. In today’s post I outline the argument for the first part of the view: the claim that colours are mind-independent. To say that colours are mind-independent properties is to say that their …

CFP: The Philosophical Significance of Molyneux’s Question

CFP: The Philosophical Significance of Molyneux’s Question University of York, UK June 5-6, 2017 Funded by a grant from the New Directions in the Study of the Mind Project (http://www.newdirectionsproject.com/) to Louise Richardson and John Schwenkler Confirmed speakers:: Mohan Matthen, L. A. Paul, M. G. F. Martin With responses from members of Sense …

Applications are open for the 2017 Summer Seminars in Neuroscience and Philosophy

Calling all curious neuroscientists and philosophers! Collaborate in the summer seminars for neuroscience and philosophy, a three year program sponsored by the John Templeton Foundation and Duke University. Our goal is to advance knowledge at the intersection of these fields. Together we can apply cutting-edge scientific research to the big questions on …

Experiencing Phenomenology: Experiencing Things and Properties

It is only a slight exaggeration to say that the history of the Phenomenological tradition is a history of the various interpretations and perceived significance of the concept of intentionality. Brought to prominence by Brentano, elaborated by Husserl, employed and modified in various ways by Heidegger, Sartre, and Merleau-Ponty, intentionality …