The Limitations of Implicit Bias

This post about epistemic in justice and implicit bias by Susanna Siegel is the third post of this week’s series on An Introduction to Implicit Bias: Knowledge, Justice, and the Social Mind (Routledge, 2020). Find the other posts here. The first waves of research in psychology surrounding implicit bias claimed …

4. Inference and Experience: conceptual challenges to inferentialism

I find the challenges to the coherence of inferentialism much more powerful than the objections inherent in alternatives. That’s why I devote more time in the book to making the case that inferentialism is coherent, and to explaining what form it could take. Perhaps a first type of challenge to …

3. Weakening the power of experience

In previous posts, I discussed the problem generated by the case of Jack and Jill. When Jill’s fear influences her visual experience that presents Jack as angry, does Jill get as much reason from her experience to believe her eyes, as she could if her fear didn’t influence her experience? …

1. An epistemic puzzle

On a traditional conception of the human mind, reasoning can be rational or irrational, but perception cannot. Perception is simply a source of new information, and cannot be assessed for rationality. I argue that this conception is wrong. Drawing on examples involving racism, emotion, self-defense law, and scientific theories, The Rationality …

Signing off

I wanted to thank readers for reading, commenters for commenting, and Kristina Musholt for inviting me to be a guest blogger.  Three cheers for Brains! The discussions here gave me a chance to think out loud about some questions that are dangling from a book manuscript I’m circulating. It’s called *The Rationality of Perception*. Among other …

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