Phenomenological Utopia
I’ll end my week in the spotlight on a romantic note, by presenting an idealized procedure for producing a complete theory of in the “descriptive psychology of consciousness.”
Author: Uriah Kriegel
Imaginative Phenomenology
What is the difference between the phenomenology of perception and the phenomenology of imagination? Here are three prima facie possibilities: There’s no difference There’ a difference of degree There’s a difference of kind The first view is that perceiving my dog Julius and imagining him (in the same setting) have …
Emotional Phenomenology
In the previous post I brought up the issue of how to distinguish belief from desire. In a framework in which belief and desire are treated as explanatory posits cited in the explanation of behavior, it’s pretty straightforward to identify the respective functional role each plays in the explanation of …
Conative Phenomenology
There’s a long philosophical history, dating back to Plato’s Republic, of distinguishing between a cognitive “department” of the mind (the intellect, or the “understanding”) and a conative department (the will). This is preserved in mainstream philosophy of mind within the framework of belief-desire psychology. Belief is taken to be the …
Introspection, Seriously
Maybe before plunging into the project I pursue in Varieties, I should say something on the very idea of a first-person, introspectively based project for studying consciousness. In particular, I want to comment on the idea that a crucial step in cognitive science becoming a serious scientific study, no flimsier …
Consciousness: Explanation vs. Description
A couple of months ago I got an amazing book called Owls of the World that more or less summarizes all the knowledge that humanity has gathered so far on the 250-odd species of owl inhabiting the earth. It gave me a glimpse into the kind of work a zoologist …