As before, I am very grateful to John for letting me present my work. My new book Structuring the Self (2019, Palgrave Macmillan, Series New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science), did not initially aim to introduce a new insight into the nature of selfhood so much as to give …
We are grateful to Majid Davoody Beni for blogging this week on Structuring the Self, newly published by Palgrave Macmillan in the New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science series. To view all of Majid’s posts on a single page, please click here.
This week, I’m writing a series of posts on my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). The post today concerns the topic of chapter seven, the epistemically generative character of memory. There is a debate on whether memory generates justification for beliefs about the past, or …
This week, I’m writing a series of posts on my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). The post today concerns the topic of chapter five, the phenomenology of memory and, in particular, the feeling of a memory as being one’s own (a ‘feeling of mineness’ in …
This week, I’m writing a series of posts on my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). The post today concerns the topic of chapter four, the phenomenology of memory and, in particular, two aspects of the temporal phenomenology of memory. Firstly, when we remember something, we …
This week, I’m writing a series of posts on my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). The post today concerns the content of memories; the topic of chapter three. I defend the view that memories are self-referential in that they represent a property of themselves. Specifically, …
This week I am writing a series of posts about my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). My first post, today, concerns the metaphysics of experiential, or episodic, memory. In chapter two, I address the question of what it takes for a subject’s mental state to …
