I am pleased to announce the content that will be featured at Brains in the coming weeks: From March 19-23, Armin Schulz will contribute a series of posts on Efficient Cognition: The Evolution of Representational Decision-Making, published earlier this year by The MIT Press. From March 26-30, Edouard Machery will contribute a series …
There is a lot of good news to share regarding new developments and upcoming events at the Brains blog. First, it is my pleasure to introduce two new Contributing Editors: Aaron Henry (Toronto) will organize our symposia on papers in the philosophy of mind from Ergo: An Open-Access Journal of Philosophy, …
In the next few months we will continue our regular series of journal symposia at the Brains blog, and also feature visits from several authors of recent books: During the week of February 19, Chauncey Maher (Dickinson College) will blog about Plant Minds: A Philosophical Defense (Routledge, 2017). Beginning the week of March 6 we …
The Presence of the Self in Memory In Memory and the Self, I operated with a claim that was, in hindsight, perhaps made a little too blithely. The essence of episodic memory, I argued, is that it presents an episode (a certain kind of state-of-affairs) in a specific way. You …
Thanks to John Schwenkler for the invitation to guest-blog this week about my new book, Memory and the Self: Phenomenology, Science and Autobiography (Oxford University Press NY, 2016). *** Memory and the Autobiographical Self: The Problem Intuitively, it is not unreasonable to suppose that our episodic memories play a significant …
I am very pleased to announce a new partnership between the Brains blog and the Institute of Art and Ideas. The IAI was founded in 2008 by the philosopher and broadcaster Hilary Lawson. It aims to invigorate our lives and culture by placing big ideas and critical thinking at the …
The widespread philosophical view is that reductionism in the sciences is a dead view and perhaps slightly distasteful to boot. As I outlined in an earlier post, the received view assumes that “reductionism” is semantic, or Nagelian, reduction. The goal of such semantic reduction was to show that higher sciences …
