Memory and the Self: The Presence of the Self in Memory

The Presence of the Self in Memory In Memory and the Self, I operated with a claim that was, in hindsight, perhaps made a little too blithely. The essence of episodic memory, I argued, is that it presents an episode (a certain kind of state-of-affairs) in a specific way. You …

Memory and the Self: Phenomenology, Science and Autobiography

Thanks to John Schwenkler for the invitation to guest-blog this week about my new book, Memory and the Self: Phenomenology, Science and Autobiography (Oxford University Press NY, 2016). *** Memory and the Autobiographical Self: The Problem Intuitively, it is not unreasonable to suppose that our episodic memories play a significant …

Upcoming Events at the Brains blog

With the Minds Online conference now in the rearview mirror we are back to regular programming here at Brains, including two upcoming journal symposia and visits from the authors of several new and forthcoming books: Beginning tomorrow, Tuesday 10/11, Carl Gillett will blog for several days about his book Reduction and Emergence in …

Experiencing Phenomenology: Experiencing Oneself

On Husserl’s picture of the phenomenological method, the phenomenologist must reflect on their own experience. So the practice of phenomenology involves some form of self-awareness. But how exactly ought we to characterise this self-awareness and, in particular, does it involves an awareness not just of our experiences but also of …

Nonconceptual Self-Consciousness?

Recently, there have been several attempts to provide an account of our ability for self-conscious thought in terms of nonconceptual forms of (self-)representation (most prominent among these is perhaps the account offered by Bermúdez (1998)). Proponents of nonconceptual content assume that there are ways of representing the world that are …

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