Ten years ago, Susanna Siegel proposed the method of phenomenal contrast in order to determine the type of properties that are represented in perceptual experiences. In brief, do we see only lines and colors or do we also see pine trees? Her method proceeds in two steps. First, one describes a …
Although introspectively familiar, it is hard to exactly pinpoint the nature of the specific relationship that we have uniquely with our own body. We are aware of our bodily posture, of its temperature, of its physiological balance, of the pressure exerted on it, and so forth. Insofar as these properties are …
Guest Editors: Thomas Metzinger (Mainz) & Raphaël Millière (Oxford) Editors-in-Chief: Sascha Benjamin Fink (Magdeburg), Wanja Wiese (Mainz), Jennifer Windt (Monash) We invite submissions of high-quality papers, in .docx, .rtf, or .tex format and between 6,000 and 10,000 words in length, excluding abstract and references. Citations must be inserted using a reference management software …
Many parents who look into the eyes of their newborn baby encounter something wonderful, and awe inspiring. There in those eyes they get a glimpse of a new perspective, a new point of view on the world. A new consciousness. The idea that consciousness is the subjective perspective we each …
Interdisciplinary Special Issue to appear in TOPOI, an International Journal of Philosophy THE RELATIONAL SELF: BASIC FORMS OF SELF-AWARENESS Editor: Anna CIAUNICA (Institute of Philosophy Porto / Institute of Cognitive Neurosciences, UCL London) The SI will consist of six invited contributors and a matched number of submitted papers (for submission instructions …
A guiding idea of The Given is that the notion of mental content is essentially rooted in the notion of what is given in experience. In order for something to be given in experience it must be phenomenologically present in some manner or other. That is, everything that is given …
The extent and interest of third-personal self-knowledge notwithstanding, first-personal self-knowledge too deserves attention. In The Varieties of Self-Knowledge three chapters are devoted to a critique of contemporary accounts of it. In particular, I consider Armstrong’s reliabilist model, Peacocke’s and Burge’s different kinds of rationalism, Evans’s transparency method and its two …
