Despite their differences, all previously reviewed accounts have something in common. That is, they adhere to monism with respect to self-knowledge. What they all do is focus on one specific instance, provide what seems at least a prima facie suitable explanation and then try to generalize it to all other …
“Know thyself” is the dictum which appeared on the front of the temple in Delphi. But what does that mean and why is it important? Presumably, it means to know, first and foremost, one’s own character and it is important because only by knowing one’s character can one be aware …
On Husserl’s picture of the phenomenological method, the phenomenologist must reflect on their own experience. So the practice of phenomenology involves some form of self-awareness. But how exactly ought we to characterise this self-awareness and, in particular, does it involves an awareness not just of our experiences but also of …
Call for Papers and Workshop Announcement Ruhr-Universität Bochum June 20-22, 2016 Prof. Dan Zahavi (University of Copenhagen): Lectures on Self and Other Dan Zahavi is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Center for Subjectivity Research at the University of Copenhagen. He is the author of various books on Husserl’s Phenomenology, …
Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology Guest Editors Alexandre Billon (Université de Lille Nord de France) Francesca Garbarini (Università degli Studi di Torino) Invited Contributors José Luis Bermudez (Texas A&M University) Philip Gerrans (University of Adelaide) Daniele Romano (Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca) Schedule Submission Deadline: September 1st …
Expecting Ourselves? What does it take to be a creature that has some sense of itself as a material being, with its own concerns, encountering a structured and meaningful world? Such a being feels (from the inside, as it were) like a sensing, feeling, knowing thing, and a locus of …
To provide a full account of the ability to think “I”-thoughts, we need an explanation of the transition from implicitly self-related information to explicit self-representation. In the previous post, I argued that world-directed action and perception do not require explicit self-representation. This raises the question of when explicit self-representation does …
