According to the naïve realist, colours are mind-independent properties of objects that are distinct from their physical properties. In today’s post I outline the argument for the first part of the view: the claim that colours are mind-independent. To say that colours are mind-independent properties is to say that their …
A planned special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology will focus on the subject of replicability and systematic error in cognitive science. For a call for contributions to the issue, see here. Potential topics include but are not limited to: The impact of the replicability problem on long standing theories …
Thanks to John Schwenkler for the invitation to write about my book, A Naïve Realist Theory of Colour (Oxford University Press, 2016). Colours are a prominent feature of the perceived world. They are important for us as perceivers, both because they allow us to distinguish and identify objects in our …
March 16, 2017 University of Antwerp Confirmed speakers: Dominic Gregory (Sheffield) Francesco Berto (Amsterdam) Lu Teng (Antwerp) Shannon Spaulding (Oklahoma State University) Some slots are reserved for contributed papers. There are no parallel sections. Only blinded submissions are accepted. Length: 3000 words. Single spaced! Deadline: February 1, 2017. Papers should …
July 10-13, 2017 University of Cologne, Germany Conference Abstract: Philosophizing about memory is as old as philosophy itself. Despite the long tradition of inquiry, the philosophy of memory was until recently not recognized as an area of research in its own right. In recent years, however, the situation has changed …
In my 2016 book, Rightness as Fairness: A Moral and Political Theory, I argue that morality is a solution to a problem of diachronic rationality called ‘the problem of possible future selves.’ To simplify (very) greatly, the problem–which is partially inspired by L.A. Paul’s groundbreaking work on transformative experience–is that (A) our present …
The extent and interest of third-personal self-knowledge notwithstanding, first-personal self-knowledge too deserves attention. In The Varieties of Self-Knowledge three chapters are devoted to a critique of contemporary accounts of it. In particular, I consider Armstrong’s reliabilist model, Peacocke’s and Burge’s different kinds of rationalism, Evans’s transparency method and its two …
