The 6th International Workshop on Physics and Computation (PC 2015) (A satellite workshop to Unconventional Computation & Natural Computation 2015) 31 August – 4 September 2015 University of Auckland, New Zealand Special session on Physics and Computation at the Conference on Unconventional Computation & Natural Computation 2015 The 6th International …
To substantiate the claims about our definitions of ‘consciousness’ and ‘attention’ we would like to explain how using the framework of dissociation (CAD) helps elucidate these meanings in two important ways. First, the framework shows that debates can be reinterpreted in insightful ways and second, it provides theoretical reasons to …
Attempting to understand the ‘hard problem’ of conscious experience through the lens of attention requires a discussion of what we mean by visual attention. This can be challenging since there are many forms of attention that work on several levels, both within and outside of our conscious experience.
We are very grateful to John Schwenkler for inviting us to blog at Brains. Our main claim in Consciousness, Attention, and Conscious Attention is that consciousness and attention must be distinct kinds of mental states. We offer four arguments, each explicated in a separate chapter. The first argument is that a …
In the coming weeks we are excited to be hosting our next Mind & Language symposium, on Jean-Rémy Martin and François Le Corre’s “Sensory Substitution is Substitution”, as well as several authors who will write about their recently published books: Carlos Montemayor and Harry Haladjian, on Consciousness, Attention, and Conscious Attention, new from …
CFP: Workshop “Collective Self-Awareness” September 10-12, Institute of Philosophy, University of Vienna Submission deadline: May 3 There has been a growing philosophical interest in Collective Intentionality in recent decades, but the topic of collective self-awareness is still in its infancy. How do we experience ourselves as acting and perceiving jointly? …
A number of philosophers have suggested that delusional people do not believe their delusions; they only imagine them and then mistake their imagining for a belief (Greg Currie has a view along these lines: in his recent book, Phil Gerrans defends a related view). What follows are a few inchoate …
