CFP: Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Agency

Action / CFPs / Free will
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The Philosophy Graduate Student Association of Florida State University is now accepting submissions for their Sixth Annual Graduate Conference on Free Will, Moral Responsibility, and Agency. The conference will take place on October 6th and 7th, 2017. Keynote speakers will be: David Shoemaker, Professor of Philosophy, Tulane University Michael McKenna, …

6. Descriptive names

Cognition / Content / Imogen Dickie: Fixing Reference / philosophy of language / Philosophy of Mind
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Consider the following example: Case 1: ‘Tremulous Hand’ ‘Tremulous Hand’ is used to refer to the otherwise unidentified author of around 50,000 Thirteenth Century glosses in manuscripts. Palaeographical analysis provides strong evidence that these glosses are the work of a single person with distinctive (tremulous and left-leaning) handwriting. All that …

In Memoriam: Hubert Dreyfus

Academia / AI / Phenomenology / Philosophy of Mind

Hubert L. Dreyfus, for nearly 50 years a professor of philosophy at UC Berkeley, died this past Saturday.

As many will know, Dreyfus was an early critic of artificial intelligence and an influential interpreter of Martin Heidegger and other phenomenologists. More recently he challenged John McDowell’s conceptualist accounts of perception and action with arguments that drew on his reading of Merleau-Ponty and longstanding interests in the phenomenology of skill. He will be sorely missed.

For more on Bert’s life, his teaching, and what made his approach to philosophy so revolutionary, here is a lengthy obituary by his student Sean Dorrance Kelly.

3. The mind needs to think about things outside itself

Epistemology / Imogen Dickie: Fixing Reference
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This post is about justification: the justification of perceptual demonstrative beliefs by uptake from perception, and of many of the beliefs we express using proper names by uptake from testimony. What I’m about to suggest is perhaps a little surprising. But I also suggest that extant attempts to explain how …

2. Reference and Justification

Epistemology / Imogen Dickie: Fixing Reference / philosophy of language
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In my first post I sketched an argument for a principle connecting aboutness and justification. Here is the sketch version again as a little graphic: The resulting principle, which I call in the book ‘Reference and Justification’, brings out the significance for accounts of aboutness of the fact that justification is …

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