Hylomorphism and the Problem of Mental Causation (Part 1)
The problem of mental causation is a central problem in the metaphysics of mind, but hylomorphism implies an elegant solution to it.
Category: books
Hylomorphism and Emergence
What exactly are hylomorphic structures? According to traditional hylomorphists like Aristotle, as well as some contemporary hylomorphists such as Mike Rea (2011) and myself (2012, 2014, 2016), structures are powers. More specifically, hylomorphic structures are powers to configure (or organize, order, or coordinate) things.
Hylomorphism and Mind-Body Problems
Mind-body problems are persistent problems in understanding how thought, feeling, perception, and other mental phenomena fit into the natural world described by our best science. Hylomorphists take mind-body problems to be symptomatic of a worldview that rejects hylomorphic structure.
The Hylomorphic Mind (Part 2)
Typically hylomorphists discuss their theory historically in terms of what Aristotle, Aquinas, or some other philosopher of the past has claimed. That is not my approach! The hylomorphic theory I defend dovetails with current work in metaphysics, philosophy of mind, and scientific disciplines such as biology and neuroscience. I argue …
The Hylomorphic Mind (Part 1)
Structure and the Metaphysics of Mind: How Hylomorphism Solves the Mind-Body Problem (Oxford University Press 2016) is about hylomorphism and its implications for the philosophy of mind. I argue that hylomorphism implies elegant solutions to mind-body problems. Hylomorphism’s basic idea is that some individuals, paradigmatically living things, consist of materials …
A Virtue Ethics Response to Implicit Bias
Clea F. Rees Cardiff University Developments in social psychology pose serious challenges for ethical theorists. Ethics is an essentially practical discipline: a satisfactory ethical theory will help us to live ethically good lives by enabling us to understand and navigate the moral landscape. An ethical theory should enable us to …
Three Studies That No Moral Philosopher Should Ignore
Robin Zheng Newnham College University of Cambridge In my chapter, I argue that for cases of implicitly biased action, we should set aside questions of responsibility as attributability in favor of responsibility as accountability. As I interpret the distinction, the former constitute a problem in metaphysics and philosophy of action because we are …