“If there are states of sensing bluely, they obviously do not present themselves as such—otherwise the very existence of a controversy about their existence would be inexplicable.” Sellars (1981, 67) It’s time to get down to the nitty gritty. In the first of these posts I suggested that we look …
“If he [Descartes] had examined that other, deeper opening upon things given us by the secondary qualities, especially color, then….[h]e would have been obliged to find out how the indecisive murmur of colors can present us with things, forests, storms—in short the world. …. But for him it goes without …
…. the whole philosophy of perception from Democritus’s time downwards has been just one long wrangle over the paradox that what is evidently one reality should be in two places at once, both in outer space and in a person’s mind. (James 1904:481) I chose this quotation from William James’s …
If you’ve worked in an office, you’re probably familiar with “honor box” coffee service. Everyone helps themselves to stewed coffee, adds to the lounge’s growing filth, and deposits a nominal sum in the honor box, with the accumulated proceeds being used to replenish supplies. Notoriously, this system often devolves into …
I’ll end my week in the spotlight on a romantic note, by presenting an idealized procedure for producing a complete theory of in the “descriptive psychology of consciousness.”
What is the difference between the phenomenology of perception and the phenomenology of imagination? Here are three prima facie possibilities: There’s no difference There’ a difference of degree There’s a difference of kind The first view is that perceiving my dog Julius and imagining him (in the same setting) have …
In the previous post I brought up the issue of how to distinguish belief from desire. In a framework in which belief and desire are treated as explanatory posits cited in the explanation of behavior, it’s pretty straightforward to identify the respective functional role each plays in the explanation of …
