System 2 reasoning (and a word about mindwandering)

Most psychologists who study human reasoning have converged on some or other version of dual-systems theory. System 1 is a set of systems that are supposed to be fast, inflexible, and unconscious in their operations, issuing in the initial intuitions many of us have when presented with a novel reasoning …

Working memory and fluid g

Yesterday I sketched an argument for believing that all access-conscious thinking is sensory based. But suppose this conclusion is wrong. Suppose there is some sort of workspace in which amodal (nonsensory) thoughts – judgments, goals, decisions, intentions, and the rest – can become active and be conscious. What would one …

Attention, conscious experience, and working memory

One argument for the view that all access-consciousness depends upon sensory representations is an inference to the best explanation (or rather, a series of them) that brings together recent work on consciousness with recent work on working memory. The argument builds on the findings of Bernard Baars, Stanislas Dehaene, and …

The sensory-based theory of conscious thinking

Many thanks to John Schwenkler for this opportunity to talk about some of my recent work, especially my book The Centered Mind: What the Science of Working Memory Shows Us About the Nature of Human Thought, published earlier this year by Oxford University Press. In this post I’ll sketch the …

#MindsOnline2015, Session 2: Perception and Consciousness

The second session of the 2015 Minds Online conference has begun! It is on the theme of Perception and Consciousness, and includes the following papers: Nico Orlandi (UC Santa Cruz): Bayesian Perception Is Ecological Perception (KEYNOTE) Derek H. Brown (Brandon University): “Colour Layering and Colour Relationalism” Commentators: Mazviita Chirimuuta and Jonathan Cohen Jonathan Farrell (Manchester): “‘What …

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