Many thanks to John who invited me to blog about my book Embodied Emotions this week. The book explores emotions as embodied, action-oriented representations, providing a non-cognitivist theory of emotions that aims to account for their normative dimensions within a naturalist framework. I will come back to what that all …
Kriegel, ed. (2014), Current Controversies in Philosophy of Mind, Routledge. I just used this volume in my Phil Mind class, hoping to find useful introductions to some current debates. The volume has five parts. Each part contains two essays. Ideally, the two essays would present opposite points of view so …
Thanks to John Schwenkler for the invitation to guest-blog this week about my book What the Body Commands: The Imperative Theory of Pain (MIT Press 2015). My book is devoted to defending pure imperativism about pains. Imperativism is the claim that pains are akin to imperatives in ordinary language.
Applications are now being accepted for the Summer Seminars in Neuroscience and Philosophy (SSNAP), to be held at Duke University from May 22 to June 5, 2016. The SSNAP consist of two weeks of intensive training in philosophy and neuroscience with the aim of fostering collaboration between the two disciplines. A total …
The argument from fineness of grain is probably the most discussed argument for nonconceptualism. (To name but a few discussants: Peacocke 1998, 2001a, 2001b; McDowell 1994, 1998, Brewer 1999, 2005, Tye 2005, Coliva 2003, Kelly 2001a, 2001b, Veillet 2014.) To account for the fine-grained phenomenal character of visual experience in …
In my previous post, I referred several times to the state view/content view distinction. As has been argued by authors such as Byrne (2005) or Crowther (2006), the distinction is problematic for nonconceptualists to the extent that they want to make a claim about perceptual content. For central pro-nonconceptualist arguments …
Typically, nonconceptualism is introduced in terms of concept possession. Take for instance, the first claim from the recently updated SEP entry on nonconceptual content: The central idea behind the theory of nonconceptual mental content is that some mental states can represent the world even though the bearer of those mental …
