It’s my pleasure to introduce this symposium on Bernard Molyneux’s paper “The Logic of Mind-Body Identification” (in the current issue of Ergo), with commentaries by Liz Irvine (Cardiff), István Aranyosi (Bilkent), and Jonathan Simon (NYU). Molyneux’s paper introduces a new strategy for explaining why proposed identities between the mental and …
The New Directions in the Study of the Mind Project welcomes proposals for philosophical and scientific approaches to the study of the mind which do not make the physicalist and reductionist assumptions familiar in these disciplines. Proposals can be for funding that supports various research needs: a major project on …
My last post focused on the relationship between minimal phenomenal selfhood in dreams, spatiotemporal self-location, and bodily experience. But there is another and in some ways more traditional way of thinking about the relationship between dreaming and the self. This is to focus on the epistemic relation between the self, …
Association for the Advancement of Philosophy and Psychiatry 28th ANNUAL MEETING May 14-15, 2016 Atlanta, GA Call for Abstracts PHILOSOPHICAL ISSUES IN SCIENTIFIC PSYCHIATRY: RDOC, DSM, MECHANISMS, AND MORE Conference co-chairs: Şerife Tekin & Peter Zachar
As we move from wakefulness into sleep onset and through the different stages of sleep, there are concerted changes in brain activity, the way we process external stimuli from the environment, and in the contents and structure of conscious experience. At the same time, the exact relationship between these changes …
The Oxford Studies in Experimental Philosophy series, published by Oxford University Press and edited by Tania Lombrozo, Joshua Knobe, and Shaun Nichols, is now calling for papers for its second volume. The deadline for submissions is March 1, 2016. For more details, see the X-Phi blog.
We all dream every night, and most of us feel reasonably certain that we know what it is like to dream. But how well do we really know the phenomenology of dreaming? Can we really be certain that in describing our dreams, we are not merely projecting implicit, pretheoretical assumptions …
