SpaceTimeMind

You may (or may not) have noticed that Pete Mandik and Richard Brown (me) have started a podcast, called SpaceTimeMind, where we talk about tax law updates for 2014, uh, I mean, er, we talk about space and time and mind! The first episode is up now (and has been …

Aliens versus materialists (Part III): Phenomenal concepts to the rescue?

A year ago we met an alien species (Part I) that lacked subjective conscious states but were virtuoso scientists. They developed a detailed understanding of cat brains at every level of organization, but still did not realize that cats were conscious. This was parlayed into an argument for dualism (Part …

A New Theory of Free Will

Just a quick note that I recently published an article in The Philosophical Forum , “A New Theory of Free Will“, that may be of interest to readers (a free PDF of the penultimate draft is available here).  Here’s the abstract:  This paper shows that several live philosophical and scientific hypotheses – including …

Reconstructing the movie in your head, Redux

I’ve been thinking about the paper and movie linked at the previous post. Have a look at that if you haven’t, because it’s neat.  Here’s what you might think about the movie. You might look at the clip on the left and the movie on the right, and think “Wow! …

Neural Computation and the Computational Theory of Cognition

This paper (co-authored with theoretical and experimental neuroscientist Sonya Bahar) is what I’ve been aiming at during all these years.  This is why I made this big fuss over developing an adequate non-semantic account of computation. I think the paper is finally ready to submit, but I’d love to get some …

The Identity Theory and Mind-Brain Correlations

By Brandon Towl In another thread (“What’s a good reading against type-identity theory for neuroscientists?”), I mentioned that I had a forthcoming paper in Philosophical Psychology that puts pressure on the IBE argument for identity theory.  Below is the abstract.  If anyone would like a draft of the paper, please …

Back to Top