Philosophy and the Mind Sciences (PhiMiSci) has published its inaugural issue: a special issue on “Radical disruptions of self-consciousness”, edited by Thomas Metzinger and Raphaël Millière. This special issue is about something most of us might find hard to conceive: states of consciousness in which self-consciousness is radically disrupted or altogether …
As before, I am very grateful to John for letting me present my work. My new book Structuring the Self (2019, Palgrave Macmillan, Series New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science), did not initially aim to introduce a new insight into the nature of selfhood so much as to give …
This week, I’m writing a series of posts on my new book Memory: A Self-Referential Account (Oxford University Press, 2019). The post today concerns the topic of chapter five, the phenomenology of memory and, in particular, the feeling of a memory as being one’s own (a ‘feeling of mineness’ in …
This week, I’m blogging about my new book, The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, September 2019). Today, I’ll discuss the epistemic role of consciousness in introspection. What is introspection? Literally, ‘introspection’ means ‘looking within’. But the term is often used as a placeholder for the distinctively first-personal way …
I am delighted to announce the next symposium in our series on articles from Neuroscience of Consciousness. Neuroscience of Consciousness is an interdisciplinary journal focused on the philosophy and science of consciousness, and gladly accepts submissions from both philosophers and scientists working in this fascinating field. We have two types …
In the previous post, I argued that the feeling of ownership must be conceived of as an affective feeling. But one may wonder whether this affective feeling is not just a side-effect of the feeling of ownership, and not the feeling itself. Evolutionary significance indeed is only a consequence of ownership …
The claim so far is that it feels different when one is aware that a hand is one’s own and when one is not. Now one needs to explore this phenomenological difference and determine its nature. There are three ways to go from here: Bodily experiences represent only low-level sensory …
