“Radical Disruptions of Self-Consciousness”

Philosophy and the Mind Sciences (PhiMiSci) has published its inaugural issue: a special issue on “Radical disruptions of self-consciousness”, edited by Thomas Metzinger and Raphaël Millière. This special issue is about something most of us might find hard to conceive: states of consciousness in which self-consciousness is radically disrupted or altogether …

1. Structuring the Self, a new metaphysical enterprise

As before, I am very grateful to John for letting me present my work. My new book Structuring the Self (2019, Palgrave Macmillan, Series New Directions in Philosophy and Cognitive Science), did not initially aim to introduce a new insight into the nature of selfhood so much as to give …

A Simple Theory of Introspection

This week, I’m blogging about my new book, The Epistemic Role of Consciousness (Oxford University Press, September 2019). Today, I’ll discuss the epistemic role of consciousness in introspection. What is introspection? Literally, ‘introspection’ means ‘looking within’. But the term is often used as a placeholder for the distinctively first-personal way …

Symposium on Letheby and Gerrans, “Self unbound: ego dissolution in psychedelic experience”

I am delighted to announce the next symposium in our series on articles from Neuroscience of Consciousness.  Neuroscience of Consciousness is an interdisciplinary journal focused on the philosophy and science of consciousness, and gladly accepts submissions from both philosophers and scientists working in this fascinating field. We have two types …

Mind the body (4) What kind of first-personal content?

In the previous post, I argued that the feeling of ownership must be conceived of as an affective feeling. But one may wonder whether this affective feeling is not just a side-effect of the feeling of ownership, and not the feeling itself. Evolutionary significance indeed is only a consequence of ownership …

Mind the body (3) What is the experience of bodily ownership?

The claim so far is that it feels different when one is aware that a hand is one’s own and when one is not. Now one needs to explore this phenomenological difference and determine its nature. There are three ways to go from here: Bodily experiences represent only low-level sensory …

Mind the body (2) A phenomenal contrast for bodily ownership

Ten years ago, Susanna Siegel proposed the method of phenomenal contrast in order to determine the type of properties that are represented in perceptual experiences. In brief, do we see only lines and colors or do we also see pine trees? Her method proceeds in two steps. First, one describes a …

Mind the body (1) A most intimate and obscure relation with one’s body

Although introspectively familiar, it is hard to exactly pinpoint the nature of the specific relationship that we have uniquely with our own body. We are aware of our bodily posture, of its temperature, of its physiological balance, of the pressure exerted on it, and so forth. Insofar as these properties are …

CFP: Selfless Minds: Radical Disruptions of Self-Consciousness

Guest Editors: Thomas Metzinger (Mainz) & Raphaël Millière (Oxford) Editors-in-Chief: Sascha Benjamin Fink (Magdeburg), Wanja Wiese (Mainz), Jennifer Windt (Monash) We invite submissions of high-quality papers, in .docx, .rtf, or .tex format and between 6,000 and 10,000 words in length, excluding abstract and references. Citations must be inserted using a reference management software …

Consciousness is something you do

Many parents who look into the eyes of their newborn baby encounter something wonderful, and awe inspiring. There in those eyes they get a glimpse of a new perspective, a new point of view on the world. A new consciousness. The idea that consciousness is the subjective perspective we each …

CFP: The Relational Self

Interdisciplinary Special Issue to appear in TOPOI, an International Journal of Philosophy THE RELATIONAL SELF: BASIC FORMS OF SELF-AWARENESS Editor: Anna CIAUNICA (Institute of Philosophy Porto / Institute of Cognitive Neurosciences, UCL London) The SI will consist of six invited contributors and a matched number of submitted papers (for submission instructions …

First-Personal Self-Knowledge

The extent and interest of third-personal self-knowledge notwithstanding, first-personal self-knowledge too deserves attention. In The Varieties of Self-Knowledge three chapters are devoted to a critique of contemporary accounts of it. In particular, I consider Armstrong’s reliabilist model, Peacocke’s and Burge’s different kinds of rationalism, Evans’s transparency method and its two …

The Varieties of Self-Knowledge

Despite their differences, all previously reviewed accounts have something in common. That is, they adhere to monism with respect to self-knowledge. What they all do is focus on one specific instance, provide what seems at least a prima facie suitable explanation and then try to generalize it to all other …

Experiencing Phenomenology: Experiencing Oneself

On Husserl’s picture of the phenomenological method, the phenomenologist must reflect on their own experience. So the practice of phenomenology involves some form of self-awareness. But how exactly ought we to characterise this self-awareness and, in particular, does it involves an awareness not just of our experiences but also of …

CFP: Pathologies of Self-Awareness

Special issue of the Review of Philosophy and Psychology Guest Editors Alexandre Billon (Université de Lille Nord de France) Francesca Garbarini (Università degli Studi di Torino) Invited Contributors José Luis Bermudez (Texas A&M University) Philip Gerrans (University of Adelaide) Daniele Romano (Università degli Studi di Milano-Bicocca) Schedule Submission Deadline: September 1st …